How could the Nazgul take Minas Morgul?

[Kuruharan]

They (the stockpiles) could come from anywhere. Rhun seems likely, and surely the Witch-King could 'persuade' the Easterlings and Wainriders to give him what he needed in the way of supplies, as well as providing themselves as troops. I don't see it being very hard to slip supplies through the back-door of Mordor, either.

That is a long supply line if I ever saw one. Long supply lines equal inevitable problems and delays even under the best of circumstances (and I can concede that transport across Mordor certainly would not have been encumbered by things like the enemy activity and bandits that often plagued supply lines in this day and age). Still, you have things like broken transports, the need for the transporters to eat a chunk of the supplies, considering the derelict state of Mordor I would assume bad roads, all sorts of stuff. Gondor was actually in a much more favorable logistical position.

And one must also take note that Angmar's defeat was already in the past. The power of Gondor could very well have waned in that time just enough to leave the army incapable of responding properly to the situation.

I kind of doubt that. The time involved was not that long and there is no plague or famine or other massive population reducing event mentioned during that time.

It makes more sense for him to want to take revenge in a rather violent manner. And from the Witch-King's campaigns in Angmar, we see that he prefers to cause destruction and death, razing entire areas as the army passes.

I think in this case the issue is what he was capable of doing rather than what he wanted to do.

Besides orcs, as CaptainofDespair has observed, there were also Wainriders and men of Khand and Harad that the Nazgûl could use to prevent Gondor from accessing the first few miles of the pass.

Minor point: Hadn’t the Wainriders been completely broken 56 years before this though?

Anyway, on to the big stuff…

That is true: the Morgul forces had a continuous link to their bases of supply; but the garrison of Minas Ithil was isolated, and eventually it did fall. No reinforcements could get into Minas Ithil, nor could food or military goods; for the Morgul army, however, whatever its size, it could be reinforced at will from the Mordor end of the pass, and it could be freely resupplied and re-equipped without interference or interruption.

As I pointed out above, I’m not sure this is the case. Just a glance at the map indicates that Gondor was in a better logistical position because their supply lines were shorter. In a protracted campaign of attrition of the type you are proposing, I think Gondor would have had the decisive advantage, therefore, I don’t think that is what happened.

No doubt they had an excellent picture of the tactical situation, and they had far superior communications, having no impediment to their lines of communication with Minas Ithil; however, they had no way to take advantage of their intelligence, unless you can demonstrate how Gondor could effect a military operation in Mordor or the eastern end of the Ithil pass without resort to the Ithil pass or the Morannon.

You say that “they would be willing to pay a pretty heavy price” to defend Minas Ithil, and I agree: but once the Morgul force was entrenched along the entire western approach to Minas Ithil, the “advantages” for Gondor would be much akin to those enjoyed during World War I by armies attacked heavily entrenched positions: very poor prospects indeed. It would seem that most of the Nazgûl were there as well, and anytime a breach began to form in the Morgul lines, I suspect one or more of them would join in the fray.

For one thing, the advantage conferred to the defender by entrenched positions was not anything like as great in this style of warfare as they were in World War I. (Actually, given the particular style of warfare described in Middle-earth, I prefer the term “fortified” and will use that.) Assuming that the Mordorian forces had walled off the western end of the pass, even in depth, all the Gondorians would have needed to do was employ conventional siege tactics to breach each layer of fortification. While this could be costly, given the logistical advantages of Gondor I think they would have succeeded had they tried this.

It would seem that most of the Nazgûl were there as well, and anytime a breach began to form in the Morgul lines, I suspect one or more of them would join in the fray.

True, but the Witch-king’s presence didn’t turn the tide at Fornost and their power was reduced in daytime and their master’s power had not grown as great at that point as it did later.

An oversimplification of the events surrounding the defeat of Angmar. The Witch-king was defeated because in his pride after having seized Fornost

Perhaps, but the rest of your explanation, interesting as it is, is an overcomplication of the point I was trying to make. My point was that Gondor was able to fling an army sufficient to crush Angmar (no small feat) about 1000 miles away from its home base (also no small feat) and yet a mere 25 years later Gondor couldn’t muster the strength to defend one of its primary cities. I find this impossible to swallow if conventional tactics are all that is considered.

which is exactly why even a large army from Gondor would be of less effect: only the front lines of the two armies could fight, and all the advantages would accrue to the Morgul side.

It depends on what you are wanting to do. If one is just wanting to grind it out, than a meeting of the front lines is all that is required. But I don’t think a Thermopylaesque battle in the pass is what would have happened anyway (a situation where I think the Gondorians would have won in the end anyway, just like the Persians did). I think it would have been more of a siege.

I don’t find any conflicting information: it is extremely sparse, but I do not see any internal conflicts or counterindications. The text is quite clear that the Nazgûl led a force that descended upon Minas Ithil by surprise, invested the citadel, and took it after a two-year siege.

I’m afraid that the words “take by surprise” followed by “two-year siege” used regarding the same event have a rather jarring effect in my brain.

Also, see the bit about Gondor’s potency in 1975 and then their apparent utter impotence in 2000-2002. This just does not compute.

[Farael]

Well, I was going to post something rather similar to what Kuruharan has said about the supply lines... sending food and equipment over hundreds of miles of (at best) deserted, if not full of bandits, terrain is no easy task (and no, the fact that the Nazghul are "baddies" does not mean that they won't be attacked by bandits. There are quite a few instances of orcs attacking other orcs and ultimately benefitting the "Good" people, not the less the massacre of the tower of Cirith Ungol which allowed Sam and Frodo to escape).

But there is another side to this matter. Reinforcements. I believe we have all agreed that the Nazghul did not have a huge army. Furthermore, if they could not gather a huge army, how could they find reinforcements? As Kuruharan mentioned, Gondor could easily besiege the Nazghul fortifications and bide their time. Two years is a lot of time, and yet not enough time for the Nazghul to build a fortress out of thin air. Best case scenario, they'd have a wooden pallisade with a big ditch and stakes to prevent a cavalry attack. All nice and dandy, but I'm sure Gondor could get a catapult or two. Just keep on shelling them, they can't replace their losses. Furthermore, as I mentioned, their fortifications are not likely to have been made of stone... thus easily breakable by a good solid chunk of rock flung by a catapult. And don't ask me where they'd get rocks from, they are near a mountain range!!!

Furthermore, it seems we are forgetting one little thing. There are still some forces in Minas Ithil, so the Nazghul would have been fighting a battle in two fronts. At any point in time, and with the help of the Palantir which made comunications easy, the Gondor forces could attack the Nazghul on two fronts... the main force would start an attack, and at the heaviest point a smaller force from Minas Ithil could attack the enemy at their rear. Say, give the Nazghul a month to get their fortifications in place, shell them for a day or two and then attack them in two fronts. A determined attack on two fronts would dislodge any army... the catapults would negate the "fortifications" (or some of them anyway) and furthermore, they'd cause at least some losses that the Nazghul could not replace.

[Alcuin]

Just a glance at the map indicates that Gondor was in a better logistical position because their supply lines were shorter. In a protracted campaign of attrition of the type you are proposing, I think Gondor would have had the decisive advantage…

However long the Morgul lines of supply, Minas Ithil had no lines of supply at all: that was its problem. The Morgul army could be resupplied and reinforced almost at leisure; but not so Minas Ithil: no loss it sustained could be replaced. I am not “proposing” that there was a “protracted campaign,” I am relying upon Tolkien’s multiple assertions that the city was besieged for a long period. The exercise is not to negate what he wrote, but to explain it, is it not?

I agree with you, Kuruharan, that the military posture of Gondor is unlikely to have deteriorated in any significant way between III 1975 when Arnor collapsed and III 2000 when the siege of Minas Ithil began. The problem was, I think, that the Dúnedain of Gondor were first unprepared for any attack at all, believing that having vanquished both the Wainriders and the Haradrim, they faced no risk of attack; and in the second place, they had no idea what tactical problems they faced in combating the Ringwraiths.

Eärnil lacked the insight and experience to deal with the Nazgûl, something the commanders of Arthedain possessed in spades; Arthedain lacked the means to defend itself from the assault of Angmar, and Gondor was slow to come to its aid, when timely assistance might have saved the struggling kingdom. In this way the words of Malbeth the Seer came true (RotK, “Appendix A”, “Gondor and the Heirs of Anárion”),

...a choice will come to the Dúnedain, and if they take the one that seems less hopeful, then your son will change his name and become king of a great realm. If not, then much sorrow and many lives of men shall pass, until the Dúnedain arise and are united again.

I think the import is that Arvedui and his captains among the Northern Dúnedain possessed the experience, skills and insight their kinsfolk in Gondor lacked to break the siege; but they were dead or scattered.

As for some of the unique problems conflict with the Ringwraiths might entail, consider these points as a beginning:

• The Ringwraiths could move invisibly through the lines to spy upon their opponents.
• The Ringwraiths could move invisibly through the lines to attack or assassinate their opponents.
• The Ringwraiths could terrify their opponents. Tolkien says, in fact, that this was their primary advantage, and that they had not other particular physical advantages, aside from invisibility.
• The Ringwraiths possessed Morgul-knives, a weapon apparently well-known to the Northern Dúnedain, well enough that Aragorn knew about them and how to deal with them 1,000 years later. The effect of these weapons must have been frightening and demoralizing to the soldiers of Gondor.

As for what you regard as the ineffectiveness of Witch-king in the North, I recall that Angmar had besieged and taken Fornost, apparently slaughtering the inhabitants when it fell, annihilating the greater part of the Northern Dúnedain. The Elves of Lindon were present at the battle on the plain between Lake Nenuial and the North Downs, including Círdan, who is named as the commander of the combined army of the Elves and Dúnedain. Círdan also helped Arthedain repel the Angmar army in III 1409. I think Elves were less susceptible to the fear exuded by the Nazgûl as well, perhaps, as their weapons. In any case, I believe Tolkien indicates that the reason the complete victory of the allies over Angmar was because the Witch-king erred in coming out into the plain to meet their attack rather than waiting for them to approach Fornost, which he held: it seems that he might have been more successful had he waited for them there.

If one is just wanting to grind it out, than a meeting of the front lines is all that is required. But I don’t think a Thermopylaesque battle in the pass is what would have happened anyway (a situation where I think the Gondorians would have won in the end anyway, just like the Persians did). I think it would have been more of a siege.

It was a siege! My reference to Thermopylae has to do with defending a narrow pass: an advantage accrues to a smaller force in command of a pass: the front lines are compressed, and a well-trained, well-prepared, well-led group can often fend off repeated attacks from a much larger force because it is impossible for the larger force to bring its numbers to bear.

You are in error about the Persian victory at Thermopylae. Xerxes never broke the Greek blockade of the pass despite repeated frontal assaults. The Greeks were betrayed by Ephialtes of Trachis, who is remembered as one of the great traitors of history. He led the Persian infantry by a “secret” way over the mountain to attack the Greeks from behind. In the case of Minas Ithil, the “secret way” was through Torech Ungol, but that was under control of the Nazgûl who first seized the Tower of Cirith Ungol by treachery, besides any difficulties the Dúnedain would have faced from Shelob.

You are correct about the word “fortification” to describe what the Morgul army probably did to secure their positions. I think you are overlooking the outcome of any fortifications, however: they would give the Morgul army the same tactical and strategic advantages over any counterattack by Gondor that Gondor’s fortifications enjoyed against attacks by Mordor or the Haradrim or the Easterlings. It was a strategic reversal of monumental proportions and a disastrous loss for Gondor.

I’m afraid that the words “take by surprise” followed by “two-year siege” used regarding the same event have a rather jarring effect in my brain.

I don’t understand your point. The initial attack was a surprise, and a two-year siege followed. Tolkien makes it perfectly clear that Gondor abandoned or severely undermanned all its fortresses along its border with Mordor, partly out of a lack of manpower, partly no doubt because they believed there was no one in Mordor that could launch such an attack, and particularly because they had just defeated the Haradrim and, as you point out, “the Wainriders been completely broken 56 years before.”

I don’t believe Gondor was “impotent” in III 2000-2002. They were surprised, indicating that they were unprepared: they let their guard down, literally. I believe they were unable to break the siege of Minas Ithil because of topography, the same advantage that made Minas Ithil a strategically important fortress; and because they were facing the Nazgûl for the first time themselves and lacked the insight and experience to deal with them.

Tolkien’s explanation makes perfectly good sense to me.

-|-

Farael, I found your post after I finished posting.

I cannot imagine that “bandits” would interfere with the Nazgûl’s operations – not more than once, anyway: the consequences were too severe, and the folk of Mordor worshipped Sauron. Attacking a supply caravan intended for the Nazgûl should be tantamount to a religious taboo for them. Besides, it isn’t whether the Nazgûl had difficulty resupplying and reinforcing themselves, but that they could resupply and reinforce, while Minas Ithil could not. Nurn was at most ten days away, and it isn’t as if the Nazgûl launched their assault without considerable preparation.

There could never be very many troops on the front line for either side of a battle in the pass. Karen Wynn Fonstad’s map in Atlas of Middle-earth and Tolkien’s sketch in War of the Ring indicate that there was at least one severe turn in the road in the mouth of the pass, and possibly two: getting a large catapult to the front line, manning it, and preventing the Morgul force from launching an attack on it before it was ready must have presented some difficulties. Catapults in the real world were rarely dragged or wheeled into position, but generally assembled either from scratch or from pre-constructed machines disassembled and transported to where they were needed. It is not as if Eärnil’s engineers could do this without being observed, giving the Nazgûl an opportunity to respond; and since they could respond without being seen, I think that gave them a considerable advantage.

As for the force besieged in Minas Ithil, the text says that the population of the city had been devastated by plague and never recovered. We know that Gondor had already abandoned its posts along the border. I think we can safely assume that Minas Ithil had a very small garrison for its size and importance.

Any counterattacks launched from Minas Ithil, unless successful in breaking the siege, would leave the citadel in a weaker position. If the garrison were small to begin with, as it seems to have been, then launching a counterattack would be a risky proposition. They might have tried it in concert with an attack on the mouth of the pass, since they had excellent communication with the army of Gondor outside; but again, I think that Dúnedain of Gondor lacked the insight and experience to deal with the Nazgûl.

[CSteefel]

Originally Posted by Alcuin

The problem was, I think, that the Dúnedain of Gondor were first unprepared for any attack at all, believing that having vanquished both the Wainriders and the Haradrim, they faced no risk of attack; and in the second place, they had no idea what tactical problems they faced in combating the Ringwraiths.

Eärnil lacked the insight and experience to deal with the Nazgûl, something the commanders of Arthedain possessed in spades;

This seems to be the key--the Dunedain of Gondor were simply not prepared for an assault of this kind by the Nazgul. A conventional assault (with Orcs, for example) would have been unlikely to have succeeded. And as Alcuin has said, the Arthedain had considerably more experience in this department, plus they had the aid of the Elves. In the end it was Glorfindel who drove off the Witch King...

[FeRaL sHaDoW]

I think i have read somewhere that the Nazgul have some power to influence or take control of people. Couldent they just turn the city people agaisnt them selves. Then in the end wouldent the nazguls just have to walk in.

[Kuruharan]

However long the Morgul lines of supply, Minas Ithil had no lines of supply at all: that was its problem.

But not in the sense of Gondor being able to launch a relief expedition. To me that is the issue at play here; why Gondor does not appear to have sent a considerable relief expedition at least on the scale of the armada they sent to the north. I’m not the least bit surprised that Minas Ithil would fall because it was cut off from supplies. It is a truism of warfare that a besieged stronghold will ultimately fall if not relieved.

The exercise is not to negate what he wrote, but to explain it, is it not?

That is what I am trying to do.

The problem was, I think, that the Dúnedain of Gondor were first unprepared for any attack at all, believing that having vanquished both the Wainriders and the Haradrim, they faced no risk of attack; and in the second place, they had no idea what tactical problems they faced in combating the Ringwraiths.

But they had two years to learn. This is plenty of time to assemble, equip, and dispatch a significant relief effort.

Eärnil lacked the insight and experience to deal with the Nazgûl

I don’t believe this description of him lines up with his description in the book.

· The Ringwraiths could move invisibly through the lines to spy upon their opponents.
· The Ringwraiths could move invisibly through the lines to attack or assassinate their opponents.
· The Ringwraiths could terrify their opponents. Tolkien says, in fact, that this was their primary advantage, and that they had not other particular physical advantages, aside from invisibility.
· The Ringwraiths possessed Morgul-knives, a weapon apparently well-known to the Northern Dúnedain, well enough that Aragorn knew about them and how to deal with them 1,000 years later. The effect of these weapons must have been frightening and demoralizing to the soldiers of Gondor.

I doubt they could assassinate while being invisible. I think they had to have a form to be able to do things like that.

As for the terror they generated, I don’t think that at this time it would have been as great as it became later. As I said in my above post, their master was still rebuilding his power. Also, it does not seem to have done much for the Angmarian forces at Fornost.

You also seem to be conveniently forgetting that the Gondorians gained successful experience fighting against Nazgul commanded forces at Fornost. Nothing breeds confidence like success.

In any case, I believe Tolkien indicates that the reason the complete victory of the allies over Angmar was because the Witch-king erred in coming out into the plain to meet their attack rather than waiting for them to approach Fornost, which he held: it seems that he might have been more successful had he waited for them there.

True, but the terror he inspired doesn’t seem to have done him much good. For some reason he did not choose to appear until it was too late. (As an aside, I’ve never been particularly impressed with the military ability of the Witch-king, but that is a topic I’ve discussed elsewhere.)

You are in error about the Persian victory at Thermopylae. Xerxes never broke the Greek blockade of the pass despite repeated frontal assaults. The Greeks were betrayed by Ephialtes of Trachis, who is remembered as one of the great traitors of history.

*groan* Oh please! A win, is a win. It doesn’t matter how it comes.

a well-trained, well-prepared, well-led group can often fend off repeated attacks from a much larger force because it is impossible for the larger force to bring its numbers to bear.

Have any Mordorian forces ever impressed you as being well-trained, well-equipped, and well-led? They are the ones who rely on numbers. It could possibly be argued that such tight fighting in the pass would work to Gondor’s advantage because they would have the better soldiers.

I think you are overlooking the outcome of any fortifications

You mean their aggravating propensity to fall to sustained pressure if not relieved? No, I have that outcome firmly in mind, along with the nagging issue of where did the volume of supplies for the allegedly substantial Mordorian forces come from.

I don’t understand your point. The initial attack was a surprise, and a two-year siege followed.

I don’t see how it could be clearer. If the initial attack was a surprise, the fact that there was a two year siege indicated that the initial attack was a failure. The two year siege would give Gondor ample time to assemble a relieving force if that was their inclination and I believe it was in their power and they would have done so if it was a conventional military challenge.

Tolkien’s explanation makes perfectly good sense to me.

Tolkien gave no real explanation, hence the lively discussion.

I’ve also had another thought. Earlier CaptainofDespair mentioned that the Witch-king would be in the mood for a violent and quick victory. His later behavior at Minas Tirith gives some indication of what he liked to do in war. Yet this is exactly the sort of thing that did not happen. It was a loooong drawn out process.

I think i have read somewhere that the Nazgul have some power to influence or take control of people.

I don’t recall reading that before. Maybe I missed something.

[Farael]

About the "invisible" Nazghul attacking and killing their foes... there was one little detail. While the Nazghul might be invisible, their swords are very much real. A walking sword is likely to be seen. Sure, they COULD carry along just a smaller weapon and kill one or two people... but how long until they are cornered and attacked (even if you can't see them, if enough people gather around a spot and hack away they are bound to hit some mark)

And it seems we forget that the Nazghul were very much "killable" (meaning, they can be killed). The seer said that the Witch King would not be killed by a man (but he was killed by a Woman and with a Hobbit drawing an "assist") but the other eight might have been killed. I'm not sure they'd dare to attack an army by themselves. Sure, they might kill ten people each... but eventually they will be found, cornered and ultimately killed.

With regards to the catapults, keep in mind that the Gondorian army could also fortify their positions... Dig a trench, put up a palisade... and THEN assemble the catapults. Even if the Nazghul have catapults themselves, they can get out of catapult range and then engineer stronger catapults. They have two years to do so. On the other hand, we have all agreed (I believe) that the Nazghul had limited resources, so how likely are they to be able to build new catapults and the like? or for that matter, how likely were they to have catapults at all? I think we are all discussing a siege that the Nazghul did not mean to break by force... So why bring along complicated machinery if you are going to sit and wait them out anyway?

Furthermore, about the bandits in Mordor not daring to disturb the plans of the Nazghul... I think it is a clear theme in Tolkien's work that the efforts of the bad guys were never concentrated, unless clear orders came from a higher-authority. And even then, there is a lot of dissension and discontent among the ranks. At this point in time, the only authority high enough to command ALL bandits would have been Sauron himself, who we all know was not back in Mordor and commanding the peoples there. Therefore it is possible (if not likely) that the supply caravans would have been waylaid by bandits that fought for no other than themselves, as we see they often do.

Finally, while Minas Ithil could not re-supply until the siege was lifted, the forces from Gondor COULD and MUCH more easily than the forces from Mordor (if they could re-supply at all, which I'm not conceding since I still think they couldn't). In my opinion, if Gondor had had a mind, they would have lifted the siege for they had the numbers, better supply routes, better fighting skills and they had some experience, for even in these times the peoples of Gondor were likely to live longer than 30 years, were they not? The defeat of Angmar, with a fraction of Gondor's forces, had not happened THAT long ago at all. Therefore the question is "why didn't they do it?" rather than "why couldn't they do it?".

So I still stand by my theory, even though your arguments are perhaps better expressed than mine. I blame it on English being a Second Language, or my science background rather than Literature

If Minas Ithil was besieged, without a large force (for we all agree that there was no large force in Mordor available at this time) and yet Gondor did not lift the siege it is because it was in some way "unconventional". To me, it'd be better explained by a haunting and guerrilla-type warfare (For example, like Faramir did before the War of the Ring) to discourage the garrison and small population at Minas Ithil than by a conventional "YOU (supplies and reinforcements) SHALL NOT PASS" siege.

[Břicho]

In the Two Towers, doesn't Faramir mention something about treachery having been Gondor's greatest foe in the long wars with the Enemy?

I think treachery could have very well helped yield up the Tower to the Nazgul--and all the more demoralizing if so.

[CaptainofDespair]

Originally Posted by Kuruharan

I’ve also had another thought. Earlier CaptainofDespair mentioned that the Witch-king would be in the mood for a violent and quick victory. His later behavior at Minas Tirith gives some indication of what he liked to do in war. Yet this is exactly the sort of thing that did not happen. It was a loooong drawn out process.

But we must remember, at Minas Tirith the Wiki had essentially all of Sauron's power at his finger-tips. Since Sauron is still rebuilding out of Dol-Guldur (if my memory is correct), it makes sense that the Lord of the Nine would not have such powerful resources at his command. While he would love to just break the gate and kill everything inside as he had done at Fornost, he did not have the siege machinery capable of crushing such fortifications quickly, hence the siege.

I would also like to bring up a semi-new point against the idea of a haunting/guerilla campaign: that guerilla warfare does not win wars, or even sieges, by itself. We see this throughout history, from Napoleon in Iberia to Vietnam. Guerilla forces are guerillas because they do not have resources or manpower to deal with a larger threat. While they may control the countryside (as with Vietnam) through terror, it cannot be used to take cities (there are exceptions I suppose, but even then the besiegers are aided by more conventional means).

With Vietnam, Saigon did not fall until the US left, which allowed the conventional North Vietnamese army to march in unopposed. With Napoleon, his forces held numerous cities, while the Spanish and British pestered the French in the countryside, moving from hot spot to hot spot. Eventually, more conventional British and Spanish troops were deployed to reconquer Iberia. While the guerillas played a major role, they cannot lay siege without conventional assistance.

If the Nazgul and a small force were using guerilla warfare, at some point a larger conventional army would have to be used to actually take Minas Ithil.

And while I do not outright dismiss the potential for guerilla tactics to be used in some way in conjunction with conventional means, I do not think using it as the reasoning for Tolkien's use of 'siege' is correct.

When do we actually see the forces of the Enemy using such tactics in instances of warfare that are more than just skirmishing? And what types usually do this? The Haradrim would seem to be most in-line with this tactic, while Easterlings and Orcs seem to be more of the backbone infantry types of a traditional army. I cannot see the Nazgul being able to deploy these troops, especially in a desolate land such as Mordor, in such a fashion. It seems to go against the very way the Enemy fights in every other major confrontation.

[Kuruharan]

While the Nazghul might be invisible, their swords are very much real.

Hmmm…for some reason I seem to have some vague recollection of some reference that Nazgul had to have a visible form to affect the visible world i.e. they had to have a visible form to hold a sword. I might be mistaken in this recollection.

In the Two Towers, doesn't Faramir mention something about treachery having been Gondor's greatest foe in the long wars with the Enemy?

Hmmm…there definitely might be something to this, although we still have the two year siege to ponder.

Since Sauron is still rebuilding out of Dol-Guldur (if my memory is correct), it makes sense that the Lord of the Nine would not have such powerful resources at his command.

Which is exactly the reason why he couldn’t conduct a two-year long formal siege in the conventional sense.

I would also like to bring up a semi-new point against the idea of a haunting/guerilla campaign: that guerilla warfare does not win wars, or even sieges, by itself.

A good point. However, my theory always encapsulated a final attack by Mordorian forces that were significant enough to quickly overrun the weak garrison already crippled by two years of Nazgul inspired malaise and hit-and-run attacks by small forces. I find Břicho’s suggestion of treachery to be particularly appealing as a potential end game here.

When do we actually see the forces of the Enemy using such tactics in instances of warfare that are more than just skirmishing? And what types usually do this? The Haradrim would seem to be most in-line with this tactic, while Easterlings and Orcs seem to be more of the backbone infantry types of a traditional army. I cannot see the Nazgul being able to deploy these troops, especially in a desolate land such as Mordor, in such a fashion. It seems to go against the very way the Enemy fights in every other major confrontation.

I’m afraid I disagree with you on this, particularly on the use of orcs. They are in many places portrayed as raiders and I believe that this was the area of warfare in which orcs excelled. They are not such great stand-and-fight soldiers, by and large.

[Wayland]

Originally Posted by FeRaL sHaDoW

I think i have read somewhere that the Nazgul have some power to influence or take control of people. Couldent they just turn the city people agaisnt them selves. Then in the end wouldent the nazguls just have to walk in.

Good point. Whatever mechanics were employed outside, an equally important process of demoralisation, corruption and treachery was doubtlessly occurring within. We need only to look at Sauruman, Denethor and Theoden to see how good men, in Tolkein’s world, are almost imperceptibly brought down.
No doubt the end was ushered in by some small gate opened by the hands of a traitor in the dead of night, some poor orders from the captains and downright self-serving foolery or cowardice by others.
Would it not be in character to speculate that the place was as much ‘lost’ by those entrusted with its defence as it was ‘taken’ by those who wanted it?

[Kuruharan]

Guerilla fighters are not entirely self-sufficient. They often resort to using a sympathetic populace to feed them when they are on the move.

You are not taking the circumstances of the situation into account.

There was no "sympathetic" population for the orcs to impress and gain supplies from. There were targets to be scared and killed. Orcs were good at scaring and killing.

Raiding is very much a piece of guerilla warfare, but it is not the entire puzzle. This sort of activity can be engaged in by traditional armies, and actually is quite often.

Which is what I was talking about. Besides, are not orcs frequently spoken of ambushing people?

The Nazgul, too, I do not see being very good at guerilla warfare. It is rather difficult for them, it would seem, to engage in it effectively with their...unique...physical properties.

Would you care to explain why?

I think they would be uniquely suited to it because creating terror was what they did best.

Unless I am mistaken, I thought there was an entry in regards to the orcs and Easterlings, and their hatred of one another.

I can't remember reading anything like that. While I doubt that the orcs and Easterlings liked each other very much, they would definitely been on the same side.

Cite sources of where the Witch-King, as a military commander, chooses subtler methods over his favored option of traditional combat.

He tricked Earnur.

Treachery does not have to come in accord with the Enemy's plans. Such things can happen rather randomly, as an act of good fortune for the besiegers...by, in WW terms, a Cobbler type person. Thus, is not a clear indication of any subtle tactics being exercised.

True, but the other side of that coin is at least as likely. I don't think there is any fodder for either side to gain from this issue.

Thus, he could very well have had an advantage in numbers.

And where did these troops come from and how were they supported? Up to this point you've failed to give an adequate explanation for this.

[CaptainofDespair]

Originally Posted by Kuruharan

He tricked Earnur.

I would consider that more like taunting him into performing a foolish action. He never truly tricked him. Earnur was stupid enough to think he might actually get a fair fight.

And where did these troops come from and how were they supported? Up to this point you've failed to give an adequate explanation for this.

And I disagree with you there. I think I have given adequate explanation, and that you are just requiring an immense degree of evidence for support. And I do not see you requiring the same of your own side of the argument.

In any case...Parts of Mordor, Rhun, and Harad could provide both troops and supplies. Anywhere that Sauron might have held some sway. They can be supported entirely by traditional means via supply lines reaching into Rhun and Harad, and maybe Nurn. And if Mordor is so "desolate", there are not many bandits to worry about in that last leg of the journey. The only part that must be secured is the Rhun area, and by simply sending shipments with reinforcement contingents or using outposts as waypoints they could easily transport the needed supplies to the Ithil besiegers.

There was no "sympathetic" population for the orcs to impress and gain supplies from. There were targets to be scared and killed. Orcs were good at scaring and killing.

Exactly my point. Which is why I think guerilla warfare is not a viable option. That type of warfare has many different factors that extend beyond simply 'scaring' and 'killing'. Orcs are best suited for the traditional army type, which more than allows for the raiding that they would enjoy.

I can't remember reading anything like that. While I doubt that the orcs and Easterlings liked each other very much, they would definitely been on the same side.

We have seen that orcs go after one another when from different 'tribes', and even amongst singular tribes they in-fight. And that comes during times of war, as well. Thus it is entirely plausible that they would attack Easterlings, and vice versa, if tempers boil over. And they certainly would in such a situation of duress.