Quote:
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Originally Posted by davem
Do we see in the glass or through it
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The whole mode of narration, as you rightly observe (i.e. Tolkien as elf-friend, object of his own fiction), suggests
through option.
The external data (i.e all the biographical information implying that Tolkien was inventing his world suggests
in option.
But, by and by, I find that I come to conclusion that it does not matter and, that, in fact, you can not tell which mode is more ‘correct’, and the choice between the two comes down to belief, or trust, or, still better term, to
estel.
By belief here I do not mean any particular set of religious or theological statements, merely trust of authority
My wording may be a bit clumsy here, please bear with me, I'll try to be as explicit as I'm able to.
Any piece of knowledge any given person may possess if not professionaly concerned with the issue depends on belief. Per instance, I 'know' that earth is round contrary to what I observe with my very eyes as its flatness (or 'foldedness', as my dwelling is in a mountainous country), as I trust the authority of books I've read about the subject. I 'know' that stars are balls of gas, that there is such a place as Duke University, that Kangaroos live in Australia and G.W.Bush is president of USA because of said trust. For I haven't seen neither of them things with my very eyes, their existence is untested and unknown quantity for me in any way. Even if I find an eye witness to existence of these, I still have to lean on trust in authority of the witness.
Now in subcreation the very much discussed suspension of disbelief comes into play. But ‘suspension of disbelief’ is a negative term. Replace it with ‘trust in authority’, and
in the glass option is immediately replaced with
through the glass. And if the skill of the sub-creator is great, and subcreation produced approaches perfection, it is impossible to tell which is more
real – the world one sits on in a chair with a book or the one described
in the book.
The Matrix – is being
in it bad because it is [sub]created? For there is no way of telling for those inside it? Were there any guarantee (and I have that suspision even before parts 2 and 3 were released) for Neo, when he leaves Matrix, that what he had chosen is not mere exchanging of one Matrix for another Matrix, which, in itself is inside the thrid one and so forth, like to set of nesting dolls?
That was bothering me when I raised the issue of morals. The existence of Moral imperative, somehow, seems to be definitive for ‘realness’ or cogency of any given world. Middle Earth has
that in abundance (the imperative is not 'because I will profit' but 'thus shall I sleep better'). And hence my clumsy attempt on crooked logic with probability of existence of imagined things (post #408)
Or, on any given irritation ME responds with appropriate reaction, just like normal world would, even if in a bit idealised way.
Or another clumsy analogy – suppose there existed a robot in all ways like to human being, i.e., there were no way of telling it were a robot – all its organs, members and looks perfectly like to those of human being. Further suppose, that imitiation were so perfect that emotions were imitated too – i.e. robot cried when hit, and expressed fear, affection or love in a way similar to that of human
Would it be correct to say that robot can not experience love, if it said that it loved, and expressed it as a human would do?